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Second, to encourage China to invite the II.O to send a direct 
contact mission, as they have offered, to look specifically at the 
issues of the rights of free association and ways of amending Chi-
nese labor law and practices to bring them into conformity with 
ILO standards. . 
ThaIlkyou. 
[The rrepared statement of Mr. Jendrzejczyk appears in the ap-
pendix. 
Chairman BAUCUS. Thank you very much. That was very helpful. 
I particularlr urge members of this Commission to look at the sug-
gestion to jom the President on his trip to China. 
All of us have been to China many times and in various capac-
ities. I know that the one time I accompanied President Clinton, 
I learned a lot. It was very, very helpful. I particularly appreciate 
that, and your other recommendations. 
I must leave now. There is a vote. But I will come back. Chairi 
man Bereuter will continue. However, I have to give my apology to 
Mr. Xiao. Unfortunately, your little sign up there says Mr. Qiang, 
it does not say Mr. Xiao, and I very much apologize. 
Mr. XIAo. I am used to that. 
Chairman BAUCUS. I am sure you are. 
Representative BEREUTER [presiding]. Professor Feinerman, we 
would like to hear from you. Profeflsor Feinerman is from George·· 
--- town University Law Center. You may proceed as you wish. 
STATEMENT OF JAMES V. FEINERMAN, JAMES M. MORITA 
PROFESSOR OF ASIAN LEGAL STUDIES; ASSOCIATE DEAN, 
INTERI:'4ATIONAL AND GRADUATE PROGRAMS; DIRECTOR, 
ASIAN LAW AND POLICY STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNlVER· 
SITY LAW CENTER 
Mr. FEINERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you 
and members of the Commission for holding these timely hearings 
and for providing an opportunity to present our views to you and 
share the information that we have gathered in our respective pro-
fessional capacities. 
I would also like to say that I am summarizing remarks that I 
have made in a longer written statement, as have the 9ther wit-
nesses. 
I was asked to particularly addreDs some rule of law-related 
issues that deal with China's accession recently to the WTO, I will 
try to focus on that. 
But, in considering that situation, I want to start by saying that 
with respect to the rule of law, at k ...t up to the/oint of WTO ac-
cession, there are three major points that we nee to keep in mind 
as we think about how we will proceed in the future. 
First, is that there has been, and continues to be, considerable 
legalization of the People'S Republic of China which has been under 
way now for two decades. It is incomplete, it is problematic in some 
respects, but it is worth noting that this process will go on whether 
or not the United States chooses to participate in the future devel-
opment of the process. I hope we do, as I will say in a few mo-
ments. 
Second, the PRC has already experienced some consjderable law 
reforms which have made important contributions to the economy. 
78-790 0·2 
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This is important in connection with the WTO accession. But there 
are other commitments which have political ramifications, and they 
are not necessarily connected to the WTO or economic matters 
more generally, and we need to keep them in mind as we think 
about comprehensive development of the legal system in China. 
Third, despite this legalization and law reform that has now ex-
tended for over 20 years, the"e is still, unfortunately, a great deal 
that has not changed in China with respect to the rule of law, civil 
rights, political liberties, and the meaningful enjoyment of free-
doms that we take for granted in this country and other developed 
nations. 
But this pat-:hy liberalization that ha::; taken place has at ldast 
brought a modicum of political and legal change, and economic de-
velopment, which I think lays an important groundwork. . 
I have said in previous testimony to other committees in Con-
gress in earlier years, that I think it was the case 4 or 5 years 
ago--and I think it is even mor~ the case now-that more people 
in China today enjoy more political and civil rights than they have 
at any time in China history. 
It is still not enough, and there are important groups that are 
not enjoying these overall effects that reach to most members of 
Chinese society. But that is au important thing to know. 
We may want to try to push for a faster pace, faster than the 
Communist. Party leadership in China might enjoy, but nonetheless 
we need to see where things stand currently. 
I mentioned in my testimony a couple of areas that I think will 
demonstrate the partial success and the remaining problems of 
China's long, slow march toward the rule of law. 
Here, I would just mention them in order and refer you to my 
written testimony: In areas like enterprise reform, where there has 
been a partial priY&tization of the Chinese economy, but many 
problems, includini~ some that have already been mentioned this 
afternoon with regard to issues such as labor rights, such as the 
treatment of redundant workers in the modernization of the Chi-
nese economy. 
With regard to national and local leadership, there have been 
major reforms in many areas that make institutions that were pre-
viously virtually useless and bypassed usually by Communist Party 
authority much more imp0=-to.nt as we look at the future develop-
ment. Especially, here, I would note things in the State Council, 
the administrative organs ,)f the Chinese Government. 
Third, there have been i rnportant developm·.,mts with respect to 
corruption. Now, this is a p~'~blem that is beginning to be inves-
tigated by the Chinese authoni.ies themselves. They understand 
that their political legitimacy depends on a belief on the part of 
those- that they rule that the government is generally honest and 
uncorrupt., 
Stin, there is a tendency to scapegoat a few high-profile cases 
and not address some of the root causes of corruption, but this is 
an area where our experience may prove to be somewhat instruc-
tive and helpful. 
In the legal profession there has been an important development, 
especially in tenns of the numbers. My colleague, Professor Alford, 
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has written extensively and insightfully about the problematic de-
velopments in this realm. 
But China went from having fewer than 3,000 lawyers 20 years 
ago to having over 100,000 lawyers there today. Here in Wash-
ington we may not necessarily see that as a positive development 
in every respect, but 1 think it means that people who do want to 
assert legal rights, at least, have someone available to help them 
do it. 
Finally, appropriately, here in Congress I would mention that the 
National People's Congress itself has been undergoing a process of 
reform and there are now individuals and organs, including com-
mittees, that are trying to learn from the experience of developed 
legislatures around the world how to be more serious in their legis-
lative work. This is obviously important. 
1 just want to mention two points about WTO accession before 
1 conclude. As part of the protocol of accession to the WTO, China 
has made many important commitments to both reform its laws 
and to make basic changes in its legal system. 
At the first level, these 'mainly involve things like passing certain 
laws that are necessary to comply with specific WTO requirements. 
Some of those have already bean passed, other legislative reforms 
are under way. But that is just the first step .. '. 
On a second, deeper level, they have promised to adopt basic 
principles of WTO jurisprudence that most member countri8s al-
ready have, things like transparency of the regulatory regime, cre-
ation of impartial tribunals to hear WTO-related complaints and 
trade disputes. That will, ·1 think, develop apace. 
But on the third, deepest level, there are still some important 
choices that have to be made and bIidges that the Chinese leader-
ship, 1 think, has not yet crossed with respect to not only the WTO 
comnlltments, but the kind of rule of law that would really make 
it r-ussible to honor the notion that would require structural 
changes that would transform the most basic features of not only 
Chinese law and legal culture, but 1 think Chinese culture, more 
generally. 
The experience of other, former developing countries in the Asian 
region, such as South Korea and Taiwan, shows that this can hap-
pen over a period of time, but it also shows that it may take time. 
It may take several decades,· as happened there. '!'he good news 
is, it has been under way in China for at least a couple of dec..ades, 
so maybe we only have one or two more to go. 
'!'he challenges with respect to implementation, though, are le-
gion. I outlined some of them in my written testimony. The report 
of the Working Party on Accession runs to 70 single-spaced pages 
of rather dense, legalistic prose. I commend it to you, but it gives 
you some sense of the scope of what China has to do next. 
I would just like to close by making a pitch for something. I was 
gratified to hear in Congressman Bereuter's remarks opening the 
session today that there may be a commitment to more involve-
ment on the part of the United States with respect to legal and 
other kinds of educational and cultural exchanges. 
It is actually the case that the State Department and other Fed-
eral agencies that are involved in this today provide less support 
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for bilateral exchanges with China than they did 10 years ago. 
That, I think, is a shocking fal!t. 
We devote less than 1140th of the amount that is tarceted in the 
United States Federal budget for aid to Central and Eastern Eu-
rope and the former Soviet Union and the newly-independent 
states to a(;ademic and cultural exchange with China. That is over-
all, not just focused on law. 
Given the equal strategic importance of China and its vastly 
larger population, I think that this is short-sided and parsimonious 
on our part. I would note that, in the developed world, the Euro-
pean Union and Canada, for example, have major initiatives with 
respect to rule of law and law reform, not simply focused on the 
WTO, but broader. 
I think, in conclusion, the development of the rule of law in the 
future in China is going to prove to be checkered, as it ha& been 
in the past two decades. China has made enormous strides since 
the 1970's, but- in many areas it obviously has quite a long way to 
go. 
r think that China has tried to make a kind of de viI's bargain 
with respect to modernization. It wants to have a modem rule of 
law while it retains what they call "Chinese socialist characteris-
tics." The situation is likely to persist, at least for the foreseeable 
future. 
WTO accession, however, provides a unique opportunity to push 
the envelope and maybe hasten the pace of incremental change 
with respect to China's participation in the international economy, 
but in other, more basic legal areas as well. I think, with our eyes 
fully open, we should seize the opportunities that this historic era 
pruvides us . 
. Thank you. . 
[The prepared statement of Professor Feinerman appears in the 
appendix.] . 
Representative BEREUTER. Thank you very much. 
NeKt, we would like to hear from Professor William P. Alford, the 
director of the East Asian Legal Studies Program at Harvard Law 
School. You may proceed as you wish, Professor. 
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. ALFORD, HENRY L. STIMSON PRO-
FESSOR OF LAW AND DIRECTOR OF THE EAST ASIAN LEGAL 
STUDIES PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
Mr. ALFORD. Thank you very much. It is truly a privilege to ap-
pear before this important commission. 
I 3tart from the proposition that the two principal areas that this 
Commission is charged with overseeing, human rights and rule of 
law, are inextricably interwoven. 
China needs to continue to develop legally for its citizens to have 
the means to vindicate their rights, but leg-1M development insuffi-
ciently attentive to human rights will not enjoy credibility with the 
people of China, or with us. . 
Over the last quarter century the PRC has engaged in the most 
exte~siv~ program of legal cpnstructk:-\ in the hi~tory of the world. 
Consldenng that a l~eneratlOn ago \,';.ere essentIally was no legal 
system in China, a fair amount has been accomplished. 
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Hall on January 1. That same month, Yili prefecture ordered a calIlpaign agaillst folk customs such as wedding, funeral, and house-moving rituals. Uighur cadres 
must have permission before attending such events and must report back to their 
superiors. A Party official said the aim of the order was to curb extravagance and 
eradicate superstition. 
In violation of its once-a-month prison visit .J?Olicy, Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 
March 2000 to an 8-year term for sending Xinjiang newspapers to her husband in 
the U.S., was limited to one family visit every 3 months. Glass separated her family 
members during the thirty- to fifty-minute visits, at least one guard recorded every-
thing that was said, and topics for diBCUSsion W6re limited. Ms. Kadeer was required 
to wear a black tag signalmg that her crime was serious and her behavior bad, in 
part because she was unable to complete her assignments in the prison cardigan 
factory. However, she was denied the glasses she needed to work efficiently. Ms. 
Kadeer's family was subject to surveillance and harassment. A fourth son, Ablikim 
Reyim, was released in February, some 6 months before his 2-year reeducation 
through labor term expired. 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES V. FEINERMAN 
THE ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF 
CHINA (PRC) AND RELATED RULE-OF-LAW ISSUES 
FEBRUARY 7, 2002 
Members of the Commission: 
Thank you for holding these hearings and for providing an opportunity to present 
my views and to share information gathered from my 8tud~ of Chinese law, visits 
to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ongoing work In the field of academic 
exchanges between the United States and the PRC. Given China's population and 
size, strategic position, and growing economic importance, it remains necessary to 
focus upon a number of other significant considerations in formulating United 
States policy toward the PRC. In addition to recent problems relating to United 
States actions and responses to the international behavior of the PRC, recurrent 
questions surround the development of a law and the legal system in the PRC which 
remain difficult to answer. This statement is un attempt to address at least a few 
of them in the context of China's recent accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and attendant legal concerns. . 
In considering the current situation with respect to the Rule of Law in China at 
the time of PRC accession to the World Trade Organization. there are three major 
points, further developed below, that I would like to make today. First, there has 
been and continues to be a considerable legalization of the PRC which began in the 
late 1970's. This process will go on whether or not the United States participates 
in the future developments. second, the PRC has already experienced law reforms 
which have made important contributions to the economy and pdity of the PRC and 
continue aj>t\ce partly. but not solely, due to commitments the PRC has made with 
regard to wro accession. Third, despite this legalization and law reform now ex-
tending for more than t\'iO decades, there is still unfortunately a great deal that has , 
not changed in China. with respect to the Rule of Law, civil rights and political lib-
erties and the meaningful enjoyment freedoms taken for granted in most developed 
nations. 
Legal Development in China Since 1979-Background. When China opened the 
door a crack to private entrepreneurship in the late 1970's, individuals long under 
the thumb of China's Communist nomenklatura at long last began to have some 
ability to control their own fates. Today, China's dramatic economic growth is the 
result of the efforts of millions of privately owned enterprises and reforming, semi-
privatized State and collective enterprises. The economic changes in China over the 
past two decades have enabled a sillnificant part of the Chinese populace to achieve 
- more than a modicum of economic liberty and resulting ~rsonal freedom. They can 
throw off the shackles of their state-assigned jobs, thelr controlling danweis (all-
powerful work "units") and the petty martinets who previously ordere<l their lives. 
This, in turn, opens the door to greater political liberty, and even activism. Indeed, 
the public display of anti-government sentiment in BCljing and elsewhere in China 
in the spring of 1989 was largely funded-and often initiated-by Buch individuals. 
Similarly, the police-issued residence permit (hukou) no long~r serves as an indis-
pensable passport to everything from food rations to job placement, housing or em-
ployment. Market-oriented reforms have so undermined the hukon system that the 
Chinelle government is unable to exercise the demographic, political and economic 
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control it enjoyed frmn 1949 until the late 1980's. In a dynamic economy, the leader-
ship has little choice but to allow a freer flow of workers to stoke China's booming 
economy. This increase in labor market mobility comes at the expense of social con-
trol, as migrant laborers swarm into China's coastal cities and provincial centers. 
Evidence of the system's breakdown was alread>, visible over a decade ago, when 
BCOres of "most-wanted" student activists and dissidents managed to slip throURh 
the yawning gaps of the hukou net to escape from China in the aftermath of tlie 
1989 massacre. Former paramount leader Den~ Xiaoping's 1992 trip to the south 
of China and contemporaneous call for unleashing economic growth proved merely 
the final nail in the coffin lid of a crumbling system. An army of anywhere from 
100 million to 200 million migrant laborers now provides the lifeblood of China's 
economic boom. 
The death of China's paramount leader, Den~ Xiaoping, led to much reflection 
about the many changes wrought in China dunn~ Mr. Deng's leadership over al-
most two decades; however, curiously little attentIOn was paid to Deng's efforts to 
bring law to the lawless China he inherited from Mao Zedong at the end of the so-
called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Nevertheless, all of the economic re-
forms and opening to the outside world for which Deng Xiaoping was rightfully ac-
claimed would have been difficult-if not impossible-without the simultaneous em-
brace of a rudimentary legal order that has become increasin~ly embedded in Chi-
nese society with each ,Passing year. At the same time, it remams necessary to exer-
cise caution in assessmg post-Mao China's legalization; the extent and depth of 
law's ,Penetration of Chinese society today is both problematic and erratic. Parallel 
to China's economic modernization without corresponding political refoml, there has 
been a considerable amount of lawmaking activity Bince the late 1970's without the 
nationwide entrenchment of fundamental concepts of civil liberties and restraints 
upon Party and State leaders. 
The reasons for these developments in the legal field are not difficult to under-
stand.The contradiction, to borrow now-discarded Marxist terminolo~, arises from 
the desire to enjoy the benefits of predictability and regularity prOVIded by law to 
economic transactions while at the same time eschewing the contentious pluralism 
in political life that might arise from the protection of individual ri~hts under a 
more Western-style le~al order. In the view of most of China's lep.ders, mcluding the 
late Mr. Deng, the striking economic growth of China over most of the past two dec-
ades vindicates their predilection for economic reform without political liberaliza-
tion, particularly when contrasted with the rather different path taken by their once 
fellow socialists in the former Soviet Union. In the Chinese view, politicallibcraliza-
tion too far ahead of economic development seems to have produced the worst of 
both worlds: deadlocked reforms leaving inefficiflnt economies mired in back-
wardness and explosive political resentment of the failed promises of tile new order 
to produce prosperity. Despite tight ~litical and legal controls, China's leaders feel 
that they can take pride in having delivered the goods," with year-to-year double-
digit growth rates and visible symbols of economic success in the rapidly changing 
skYlines of mlijor Chinese cities. 
Yet the patchy legalization which has occurred in China since the late 1970's, 
along with other sporadic political reforms, illustrares both the inseparability of at 
least a modicum of political and legal change from accompanying economic develop-
ment alon~ capitalist market lines and the intractable difficulty of partial political 
reform which creates popular expectations of more change, at a faster pace than 
most cautiously reforming regimes-particularly one as hidebound as China's Com-
munist Party-are willing to provide. The particular areas considered beIow dem-
onstrate just a few of the partial successes and remaining problems in China's long, 
slow march toward the rule oflaw. 
Legalization in Actioll. A few areas where legalization has led to signific.mt social 
change will illustrate the new importan(;e law has assumed in Chinese society over 
the past two decades: 
• Ellterprise Reform. Since the start of China's market-oriented reforms, China's 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have faced increasing difficulties and economic de-
cline; by contraat, collectively and privately owned enterprises have expanded rap-
idly. In the late 1990's, China had more than 2 million collectively owned enter-
prises, employing over 30 million people. In the mid-1990's, there were already 25 
million self-employed business units and 600,000 privately owned enterprises; theM.: 
enterprises employed 56 million people. Non-state-owned enterprises produce over 
50 percent of China's GDP, and the output value of non-state-owned industrial en-
terprises now-accounts for the lion's share of gross industrial output value. All of 
this has depended upon new legal rules for ent.erprise, company law, bankru'ptcy re-
or~anization and even constitutional reforms that guaranteed t.he protections for 
pnvate enterprise. 
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• National and Local Leackrship. Roles and res80nsibiliticS for China's national 
and local politicians are chan~ng radically. By 201 , the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) will be pre-occupied WIth managing the state's (and the CCP's) relationship 
to an emergent "civil society." This trend has several implications for the future: na-
tional and local leadership will have to be both educated technocrats and skilled po-
litical operatives; the CCP will have to adapt to new rolcs in order to maintain its 
leadership; technocratic imp'eratives will marginalize traditional CCP political lead-
ership; and the CCP will hkely, as a result, become less politicized and more edu-
cated, at both national and local levels, reflecting its membership. Much depends 
upon the ability of the CCP to institutionalize its new roles and to incorporate new 
meml..ers and leaders who depart from the traditional mold, making use of new leg-
isle.tion to regularize these practices. For example, fixed tl'rms for senior and lower-
lp .. 'el leaders are now being observe<:!, and retirement at increasingly younger upper 
age limits is becoming COmIl1Ci-.. Although indications are that the CCP will adapt 
and maintain its control over the State and political institutions in China, resisting 
attempts to pluralize Chinese politics and suppressing dissident forces, its ability to 
influence alJ policies (especially in the economic realm) will recede as its member-
ship and leadership come more to resemble the business, education and other tech-
nocratic elites in Chinese societ,}'. 
• Corruption. Notwithstandmg the considerable attention paid to law reform in 
other areas, a separate and long running debate has been underway in China for 
the past several years with respect to the extensive and seemingly ineradicable 
problem of corruption. While the Chinese economy enjoyed tremendous growth 
under Deng Xiaoping's policies, embezzlement, bribery, extortion, favoritism, ncpo-
tism and even smuggling have not only increased in extent and variety; moreover, 
there is virtually no area of China free from these influences. Even Chinese Com-
munist Party leaders view corruption as a threat to social and political stability. It 
weAkens the legitimacy of the Chinese state, the capacity of those in power to gov-
ern and the attempts to create a more extensive rule of law in Chinese society. Purt-
ly to address these concerns, the leadership h&s since 1989 initiated various anti-
corruption campai~s of limited duration and geographic scope. A few cases have 
been widely publiCIzed, particularly where economic malfeasance has resulted in se-
vere }>enalties, including the death penalty. 
• Local protectionism. Local protectionism is another; related difficulty with re-
spect to the elimination not so much of corruption but of distorting favoritism which 
skews markets and cuts against economic efficiency. An unfortunate concomitant of 
China's market economic reforms, local protectionism has resulted from the obvious 
economic incentives crp.sted the reforms to favor local enterprises and industries and 
to eliminate, by fair means or foul, outside competition. Reportedly, in certain prov-
inces this has even led to attempts to impose illegal "duties" and other disadvanta-
geous charges on goods and services originating outside of that particular province. 
The ability of local governments under the new economic order to retain more of 
the revenue produced in that locality, along with a diminished authority on the part 
of a central government which no longer provides either central guidance or wealth-
transferring subsidies, has exacerbated these trends. The central government's ap-
parent powerlessness in the face of these developments only further erodes local 
willingness to abide by central government directives, including those ordering an 
end to local protectionism. The PRC's WTO accession commitments to national 
treatment create a great dilemma in this arena. 
• The Legal Profes8ion. Once the decision was made, as part of China's Four 
Modernizations program begun under Deng Y.iaopillg in late 1978, to resuscitate the 
legal profession and to educate much larger numbers of lawyers in Chinese univer-
sities, a remarkable growth of this long-neglected sector took place. In 1980, when 
China promulgated its Provisional Regulations on Lawyers, only a few thousand 
lawyers could be identified in the entire PRC, many of them trained either before 
1949 or during the brief period of "socialist legality" alollg Soviet lines during the 
post-liberation honeymoon between China and the Soviet Union before 1958. During 
the early 1980's, dozens of new law faculties were added to the small handful which 
had previously existed (and all of which were re-established and strengthened). 
Changes in both the Chinese economic system and in the realities of legaf practice 
over a decade and a half required a total reworking of China's laws regulating the 
legal profession, which finally occurred in May, 1996 (effective January I, 1997). 
The new Chinese "Lawyers' Law" introduced certain far-reaching and long-Qverdue 
reforms, reflecting not only certain developments which had already taken place but 
also describing a course of future refonm l desired by mllllY in the practicing bar and 
at least (rM1dgingly conceded by the senior leadership. The liberalization permitted 
under this new legislation, including the abilitl of lawyers to form fif1"!'9 as partner-
ships, responded more to the needs of China B continuing ec(l,lOmiC modernization 
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than to the calls of lawyers for greater autonomy in thei~ practice. Nevertheless, the 
law recognizes that the former requires the latter; moreover, the expansion and ex-
tension of China's economic reforms are now understood to depend upon governing 
the country by law,particularly in its market economic sectors. 
• NPC Reform. Under the leadership of Qiao Shi and its current head, Li Peng, 
China's National People's Congress (NPC) has begun to emerge from its longtime 
status as a "rubber-stamp" parliament. To be sure, it remains far from an inde-
pendent, multiparty legislative institution enjoying actual powers of parliamentary 
supremacy described in great detail in the 1982 Chinese Constitution. It is probably 
fair to say, however, that the new, higher status of the NPC stems from a leader-
ship determination to exercise "rule by law" rather than "rule of law." In the formu-
lation "rule by law," law exists not so much as a limit on State power (a feature 
of the "rule o( law" in the usual Western understanding) but rather serves as a 
mechanism for the exercise of State power-which can still also be exercised by 
other available means, such a Party discipline or leadership fiat. Thus, a more pow-
erful NPC does not nececsarily diminish the other organs of power in the PRC; in 
fact, their predominance-particularly in the case of the Communist Party of 
China-is very little challenged by enhancement of the NPC's strength. A number 
of foreign scholars have begun to credit the NPC with greater independence and ini-
tiative. Under Qiao Shi, who served as a Vice Premier and head of China's security 
apparatus, new stress was given to the NPC's role in both originating and passing 
legislation as well as providing oversight of the nation's legal work in the judicial, 
prosecutorial and administrative spheres, as well as in legislation. During the past 
several legislative sessions under the leadership of Li Peng, fonner Premier, th(,re 
has been considerable controversy-as well as a sizable number of negative vot.eH-
in connection with various legislative initiatives; such open dissension would have 
been unthinkable even a decade ago. 
Law Reform Activities. Over the past 20 years, various organizations in the 
United States have provided assistance and support for law reform in the PRC. The 
programs they created, in conjunction with a huge domestic law reform project un-
dertaken by the Chinese themselveij and parallel programs supported by other for-
eign governments and organizations, bene.fited the construction of new legal institu-
tions and the development of a legal infrastructure which are still being perfected. 
In the early phases, a few pioneers played a major role in working with Chinese 
counterparts to get things off the ground. Among them were the Ford Foundation, 
the United States Information Agency (as it was then named), the Henry R. Luce 
Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy and its party grantees, 
particularly the International RepUblican Institute. More recently, new entrants ar-
rived on the scene to continue and to expand the work, such as The Asia Founda-
tion, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, the Freedom Forum, and even the 
State Department. Two summits between Presidents Clinton and Jiang in the late 
1990's promised even greater United States assistance in the following areas: 
-Judicial and lawyer training-new avenues for law schools from both countries to 
collaborate, legal cooperation between the American Dar Association and Chi-
nese counterparts, United States Information Agency support for preparation 
and translation of Ibgal teaching materials; 
-Legal protection of human rights-The US and China held a symposium on this 
topic; 
-Administrative law-A broad-ranging exchange involving decisionmakers and aca-
demic experts on comparative administrative law was planned; 
-Legal aid for the poor-At least one symposium in Beijing has been held to con-
sider ways to expand programs already initiated by the Chinese side; 
-Commercial Law and Arbitration-Exchanges on securities law, electronic com-
merce and judicial handling of commercial disputes were planned, along with 
a program of cooperative training for arbitrators. The Chinese government also 
promised steps to ensure prompt enforcement of arbitral awards in local Chi-
nese courts. 
In most cases, the promises of those heady days of "constructiv6 engagement" and 
"strategic partnership" went unfulfilled, in part due to the fallout of the accidental 
bombing of China's Belgrade embassy, the change in PreBidential administrations 
and the downing of the EP-3 in China last spring. 
Committee on Legal Education Exchange with China (CLEEC). No treatment of 
the law reform era in China over the last two decades, or any consideration of fu-
ture US-government supported activities in legal assistance to China, should ignore 
the experience of CLEEC, created and generously supported for a decade and a half 
by the Ford Foundation. 
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Over the ~ast two decades, the volume of international legal exchange between 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States has grown remarkably. 
Much of the contact between Chinese and American legal circles has occurred in the 
academy, and no organization has been more instrumental in encouraging this de-
veloJ>ment \han the Ford Foundation-sponsored CLEEC. For 15 years (1982-1997), 
CLEEC was directly involved in the education of over 250 young Chinest' legal aca-
demics-in the PRC and in the U.S.-and in the promotion of many other fOrDlS of 
scholarly exchange between lawyers, law professors and government legal special-
ists. During that time, in no small part due to CLEEC's efforts the underdeveloped 
legal education profession in the PRC grew tremendously, both in size and exper-
tise; law faculties expanded and became much more international in their outlook; 
and academic research by Chinese specialiEts developed greater sophistication. 
From its inception, CLEEC endeavored ill-several ways to promote both Sino-U.S. 
understs.nding, at least as it related to law, and the development of Chinese univer-
sity law faculties. First, CLEEC provided trai,ning at U.S. law schools-including de-
gree programs-for a wide range of Chinese legal educators. Chinefle ~articipants 
were given placements at the best American law schools, with superviSion (for vis-
iting scholars) or instruction (for degree candidates) by eminent faculty; such place-
ments were arranged carefully to match the needs and backgrounds of Cliinese 
scholars to the schools best able to meet those needs. In certain cases, these place-
ments have resulted in longstanding exchange relationships, often beyond CLEEC's 
auspices. American host law schools generally shared part of the coots of the pro-
gram. Virtually all the other costs of this activity were supported by a seri6l.1 of 
grants from the Ford Foundation, totaling over $4 million. Among China's leading 
law faculties today, at least half a dozen are headed by alumni of CLEEC. 
Second, CLEEC, beginning in the mid-1980's, offered an in-country short course 
in American law for candidates selected to visit l\m~rican law schools as we!! as 
other individuals. Ttus program orought some of thn finest legal academics from the 
U.S. to China to teach law faculty, students and government lawyers and officials 
the rudiments of the U.S. legal system and, after J990, specialized legal topics as 
well. The U.S. law teachers served as unsalaried instructors in a challenging three-
to-four-week course that involved a great deal of contact beyond lectures in the 
classroom and proved both stimulating and inspiring to every cohort of Chinese stu-
dents that has experienced the program. The Iar~est number of direct beneficiaries 
of CLEEC are alumni of this program. This actiVlty was generously funded by what 
was at the time known as the United States Information) 5er j (USIA), now part 
of the State Department. 
A third major activity, organized by a subcommittee of CLEEC comprising law li-
brarians and supported largely by separate funding from the Henry R. Luce Foun-
dation, was involved in the provision of legal information in print and electronic 
forms to the leading law faculties of the PRC, the Institute of Law of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences and other institutions in China. Originally charged with 
making "stock" law libraries of U.S. legal materials fo~' Chinese law faculties, this 
subcommittee kept abreast of technological developments during the period of 
CLEEC's existence to move from print materiais-Iar,'l'ely law school textbooks and 
treatises-toward more modem media, including CD-ROMs, on-line legal data 
bases and the Internet and World Wide Web. Although technological limitations on 
the Chinese side during the period of CLEEC's operation limited the ability 0; the 
subcommittee to do as much as it had hoped, important inroads were made. 
Finally, CLEEC and its individual members proved a valuable conduit for other 
types of scholarly exchange in law between China and the U.S. Aside from the di-
rect funding of a handful of American researchers to carry out projects in China, 
CLEEC also helped to arrange bilateral conferences, to provide attendees for inter-
national meetings in China and to offer information and other assistance to any per-
son or institution seeking to establish links with the legal academic community in 
the PRC. Many of CLEEC's members were themselves leading academic specialists 
and experts on China's modem legal system. At the same time, no attempt was 
made to funnel Chinese participants to those U.S. law schools which had Chinese 
law specialists; to the contrary, every effort was made to place each Chinese student 
and scholar at the American law faculty with the best resources for his or her indi-
vidual program. In the end, over 40 U.S. law schools hosted CLEEG visitors. Today, 
it remainS the case that no single school or group of institutions can hope to satisty, 
by itself, the multifarious needs of China's evolVlng legal order or even Its legal edu-
cation system. CLEEC'~ Iluccesses demonstrate that a broad-based program that 
harnesses all the available talent in the United Statel! is vastly to be preferred. In 
the light of the far more generous support that has recently been promised by the 
European Union, Canada and other foreign governments and foundations, it ill high 
time for t,he United Statel! officially to step up to the plate, make good on the prom-
" 
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iaes of several years' standing and build UliOn the broad and strong foundation of 
earlier efforts. 
WIO Accessi01l. As part of its protocol of accession i;o the WTO, China has made 
many commitments to reform it.s laws and legal system. At the first level, these 
C?mmitment~ ~ainly ~nvol.ve undertaking.to pass c~rtain new le.gislation and to ~e­
VIse some eXlstm« legtslatiOn to make China s foreign trade regIme and related m- . 
stitutions compatible with the requirements of the WTO. On a secondj deeper level,' 
the PRC has also promised to adopt basic practices of W1'O jurisfruaence such as 
transparency in its regulatory regime and the creation of impartia tribun;!s for the 
adjudication of trade-related disputes. Yet, at a third, deepest level, the commit-
ments that the PRC has made in joining the WTO presage structural changes which 
promise to transform the most basic features of Chinede law and legal culture. In-
deed, the experience of other fonner developin~ countlles in the Asian region, such 
3S South Korea and Taiwan, is that the adoption of modem legal mechanisms and 
their subsequent practice over a long term mevitably creates pressures for reform 
across the board, mcluding political liberalization in line with economic moderniza-
tion and development. 
Among the reasons the PRC has been seeking membership in the WTO, enjoy-
ment of unconditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) status pursuant to W'l'O rules 
is clearly the most significant. Under the WTO, trade among member nations is sub-
ject only to minimal tariff restraints and require!J that all Contracting Parties treat 
each other «equally. n Once the PRC becomes a WTO member nation, China would 
be able to eliminate its need for bilateral trade arrangements ; although these pro-
vide benefits, including Ml<~N. similar to those promised by the GATT, such arrange-
ments must be periodically renegotiated and may be unilaterally termin!\ted. 
Membership m WTO would promise oiher benefits for the PRC's intefT'Btional 
trade in addition to MFN. The W1'O provides an important forum for coordination 
of international economic policy and resolution of trade disputes. Useful, detailed in-
formation about the economies of member nations, as well as economic policies and 
activities, is compiled by its Secretariat; such material will assist China's formula-
tion of its foreign economic and trade policy. MorE-over, from the perspective of Chi-
na's leadership and economic reformers, the WTO's requirements and market ori-
flntation are conducive to continuing reform in China's domestic economy, including 
price refonn, tariff reduction and elimination of economically inefficient subsidies 
and other market distortions. 
Notwithstanding these commitments and the substantial benefits to China of 
WTO accession, as the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China docu-
ments, there are a number of challenges in effective implementation of China's WTO 
commitments. Some of these relate to China's basic economic: policies and the frame-
work for making and enforcing them; others relate to specific poliey areas-trade 
in goods, intellectual propelty, trade in services, etc. The report itself runs to over 
70 pages of dense prose, single-spaced in tiny type. Altholljl'h less than four of those 
pages are devoted to framework i~sues related to economic policies, that brief sec-
tion deals with such important and intractable issues as the authority of sub-na-
tional governments (often the source of local protectionism); the uniform administra-
tion of the trade regime (threatened by both local variation in enforcement aud the 
lack of understanding of China's WTO commitments at the lower levels of govern-
ment in China); and judicial review of administrative actions relating to WTO re-
quirements as implemented in Chinese law (which may be hampered by lack of in-
frastructure and training, corruption and local protectionism). 
A careful examination and historical overview of China's WTO accession process 
would reveal the WTO's impact on China. Necessary legislative and statutory 
changes in Chinese legislation are being made pursuant to WTO accession. The 
need for compliance with WTO rules imposes new constraints on Chinese policies 
and the uneconomic operations of state-owned enterprises. The role of China in 
WTO diplomacy, decisionmaking, and the dispute settlement system as a result of 
the Chinese accession(e.g. role of civil society, amicus curiae briefs, etc.) should also 
provide iIllpetus for developments in the legal realm. Despite consideration given to 
special WTO rules designed for China and China's weight in the WTO diplomaticl 
decision process, China will still have to interact with other wro Il).ember nations 
in this important internationallel;al arena . 
. Processes and problems for Chma in implementing WTO rules include questions 
about whether the PRC maintains the political will to implement the WTO obliga-
tions and the challenges the PRC leadership faces in maintaining Chinese commit-
ments over time. At the same time, there will be considerable economic impact of 
Chinese WTO membership on world trade and vice v:!rsa, in particular the tensions 
resulting from increased competition in Chinese main export markets, such as tex-
tiles, microchips, etc. 
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The rise and develoPlnent of proceddral rules in the WTO is part of a larger move-
ment in the general WTO junsprudence and structures. This movement is some-
times criticized as a move toward excessive legalism in the regulation of the global 
economy, an unfortunate move from di,p,lomacy to a rule-based trade regulatory 
framework, ch81'acterized as a process of judicia liz at ion." Yet, efforts to develop pro-
cedural review at the WTO level were taken mainly as a response to the concerns 
over m"suse and abuse of domestic legal systems for protectionist-purposl~. The par-
ticular sensitivity of issue!! such as antidumping and polit.ical legitimacy concerns 
about national legal systems ):!l"ovided both an internal dynamic and discipline for 
the WTO dispute setUflment. China's accession will require that WTO panels deal-
ing with challenges to Chinese practices must demonstrate that often too rare com-
bination of willingness to enter into the arena of conflict on the one hand, and the 
wisdom to know when to intervene on the other. 
The Practical Implications for China. Procedurcl review and transparency in WTO 
jurisprudence is a recent phenomenon in thfl area of international regulation of 
world economy. Some have characterized the WTO rules and adjudication as a cilde 
of international administrative law; compared with earlier eras of "international ed-
ministration" it is intrusive to an unprecedented degree. Yet, at the same time, PRC 
accession to the WTO offers some legal safeguards for China's rights and legitimalA' 
interests. Moreover, China can take advantage of the prGcedural review in Geneva, 
for example, to curb abuse of antidumping actions by its trading partners. 
Bureaucratic culture and legal procedures in China will have to change, however, 
for the PRC to take full advantage of WTO accession. While there have been consid-
erable efforts to improve administrative procedure in China in recent years, judicial 
supervision in Chi!la in general tends to be weak, at least by common law stand-
ards. Chinese authorities will probably face a much more searching review in Gene-
va than in their domestic courts. Given the need to provide a domestic forum in 
China before proceedin~ to WTO review in Geneva, it will take time and effort for 
the individual officials III Chinese investigating authorities to become familiar with 
WTO procedures, to improve their own procedures, and to follow those procedures. 
What Is To Be Done? "','he needs that China obviously has in so many areas also 
present opportunities not only for United States assistance but also, in the process 
of providing such support, to inculcate American institutional preferences and legal 
cultural values. More to the point, the assistance that is being offered (and gener-
ously underwritten) by others insurcq that their institutions and values will displace 
those which we might llrefer if the United States does not provide similar sorts of 
Rule of Law assistance III connection with WTO accession. 
Moreover, the c:lallenge now facing the U.S. is to emphasize China's obligations 
under all those international agreement it has signed (such as the Convention 
against Torture, International Human Rights Covenants and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women). Furthermore, China's 
domestic laws-beginning with China's 1982 Constitution-express in domestic Chi-
nese legislation those universal values which are elsewhere enshrined in both in 
international treaties and other nation's domestic laws. We need to increase the 
level and frequency-at the same time lowering the volum6-{)f di~log with China, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, over a range of legal issues, not only WTO-related but 
extending to civil and political rights. Expanding current exchange relationships fo-
cused on economic law can provide both an avenue for such dialog and a base on 
which to build relationships with sympathetic audiences in China. 
The evolution of democra<.y in China will be a long, painful process. It depends 
primarily on economic growth, including greatly increased domestic investments in 
mfrastructure, education and science and technology. The rise of a middle c:ass in 
China-as in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiw811 and South Korea previously-along 
with exposure to the outside world and moral support from the West will inevitably 
press for a more open political system. 
Most significantly, China's dissidents-within China and abroad-are. virtually 
unanimous in their support of China's accession to the WTO. They understand the 
crucial linkliges between China's enjorment of MFN status, along with access to 
U.S. export markets, and the increase m personal liberty that results from concomi-
tant economic growth. With virtually one voice, these mdividuals-many of whom 
have suffered grievously at the hands of the Chinese State and the Communist 
_ Party-urge a more nuanced policy, building on existing relationships, promising 
true "comprehensive engagement." 
The economic and trade relationship between the U.S. and China reaches many 
more lives on both sides of the Pacific than does any other aspect. of our bilateral 
relationship. Yet I would be remiss in representing my orgaD1zation and my own 
experiences as a scholar researching Chinese law and the former director of a na-
tional U.S.-China educational exchange organization if 1 did not also describe for 
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you the remarkable opening of China to educational excha.'\ge and the greatly in-
creased access for foreign researchers. More than two d'?Ca(ies' hard -,lOrk on the 
U.S. side has, particularly in the last several years, yielded h(,'" opportunities for ' 
study and research in China. For Chinese host institutions, the pro!lpect of economic 
gail. ... -and the promise that those gains can be enjoyed and cont~olled by the people 
most responsible for their realization--has resulted in a previously unimaginable 
opening. While there are still some problems to be resolved, especially in the light 
of recent arrests and show trials of Chinese-American scholars and researchers on 
trumped-up charges, remarkable progress since 1990 has led to unprecedented ac-
cess to libraries, laboratories, archIves and educational institutions. 
Yet, despite thetl~ gains, the State Department and other Federal Government 
agencies now provide less than half the support for bilaterai exchanges between the 
U.S. and China th&t they gave in 1988! Shockingly, we devote 1/40 of the amount 
targeted in the U.S. Federal budget for such aid to Central and Eastern Europe and 
the fonner Soviet Union to academic and cultural exchange with China. Given the 
at least equal strategic importance of China and its vastly larger population, such 
parsimony is inexplicably short-sighted. -
Conclusion. The future development of the rule of law in the PRC is likely to 
prove as checkered as has the process of the past almost two decades. Since the late 
1970's, China has made enormous strides in passing laws, rebuilding shattered in-
stitutions such as the bench, bar and legal education, and in using law and legal 
mechanisms to lend some greater predictability to the overall conduct of Chinese so-
ciety and-in particular-the economy. Nonetheless, significant gaps remain with 
respect to enforcement of enacted laws, serious attacks on official corruption and 
elimination (or at least the gradual reduction) of the number of highly placed indi-
viduals who remain outside of the reach of the law, usually due to their status at 
Communist Party leaders. Although it is certainly no longer fair nor accurate to de-
scribe the PRC as a Nation without law, it would also be difficult to characterize 
it AS a Nation where the rule of law enjoys quite the same prominence as it does 
in mOJt developed Western nations or even Japan. As the Chinese like to say in de-
scribing their hybrid market economy, which possesses certain elements of the free 
market fu'mg with some remnants of the Communist planned economy, China's 
legal SysteM is an attempt to create a more modern rule of law while still retaining 
"Chinese socialist characteristics." This situation is likely to persist for the foresee-
able future. WTO accession provides a unique opportunity, however, to hasten the 
pace of incremental change at a time when the very structure of China's participa-
tion in the international economy is being perhaps perm!lnently transformed. With 
our eyes fully open, we should seize the opportunities such historic changes may 
provide. 
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To the Chairmen and Members of the Commission: 
I am honored to have been invited to testify at this, the first public hearing of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on the People's RepUblic of China, given 
your charge to monitor compliance with human rights and the development of the 
rule of law in the PRC at this critical time in our bilateral relationship. 
My fields of specialization are Chinese law and legal history, international trade 
(including the World Trade Organization), and the legal profession. I have been in-
volved with legal development in the PRC from the early- 1980's onward when, to-
gether with Professors Randle Edwards of Columbia University and Dr. Stanley 
Lubman, among others, I established the first regular program of instruction in 
American law in the PRe and the first sustained program bringing Chinese legal 
professionals to this country for advanced training. In addition, I have taught in 
China; provided advice to our government, non-governmental organizations, founda-
tions, and others about Chinese affairs; and had extensive occasion to observe Chi-
nese legal development. 
In this statement I first offer a brief overview of my understanding of Chinese 
legal development-which I see as necessary for the realization in China of inter-
nationally recognized standards of human rights, but not a substitute for that vital 
end. I then turn my attention to American and other foreign efforts to assist legal 
development before concluding by suggesting directions in which attention might be 
focused. As time and space are short, this statement is perforce a sunlmary for 
which elaboration may be found in the materials cited in my endnotes. 
